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ABSTRACT
An individual who has sustained either irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem is dead.  A person is not 
dead unless his brain is dead.  The time-honored criteria of stoppage of the heartbeat in circulation are 
indicative of death only when they persist long enough for the brain to die.  Brain death does not require ev-
ery brain cell to be nonviable but the criteria require an irreversible loss of neurologic function of a patient 
interminably supported by a mechanical respirator.
For death to be diagnosed by an irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration an absence of circula-
tion should be observed for at least two but no more than five minutes. Irreversibility is determined by a 
“permanent” loss of function meaning that the function will not be restored 1) because it will neither return 
spontaneously, nor 2) will it return as a result of medical intervention because physicians have decided not 
to attempt resuscitation.
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INTRODUCTION
A 
definition  of   death  was  established 
in the United States in 1980 by the 
National Conference of  Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws that formulated 
the  Uniform  Determination  of   Death  Act 
(UDDA) [1].  The UDDA states that “an in-
dividual who has sustained either irreversible 
cessation of  circulatory and respiratory func-
tions, or irreversible cessation of  all functions 
of  the entire brain, including the brainstem 
is dead.”  This definition was approved by the 
American Medical Association in 1980 and by 
the American Bar Association in 1981 [2].   
Today, all 50 states and the District of  Co-
lumbia follow the UDDA as a legal and medi-
cal standard of  death.
The UDDA criteria for brain death assess the 
function of  the entire brain—both cerebral 
and brainstem.  The conceptual significance 
of  assessing brainstem function is to assure 
that an individual breathing spontaneously is 
not declared dead.  In the original definition 
of  irreversible coma by the ad hoc Harvard 
Committee in 1968, the concept included an 
absence of  spontaneous respiration [3]. 
My personal interest in this topic dates back 
to a period of  medical school education that 
culminated in a project analyzing the opinion 
of  physicians regarding the concept of  death 
[4].  At that time, the concept of  death was 
in transition and controversial, but there was 
clear leadership from individuals such as pio-
neering transplant surgeon, Dr. David Hume.   
Doctor Hume wrote “there is only one defini-
tion of  death, irreversible brain damage.  Ces-
sation of  heartbeat does not constitute death 
unless it has caused irreversible brain dam-
age.  To diagnose irreversible brain damage 
there must be no spontaneous respirations.” 
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These observations were later corroborated 
by Dr. William Sweet published in the New 
England Journal of  Medicine when he wrote 
“it is clear that a person is not dead unless his 
brain is dead.  The time-honored criteria of  
stoppage of  the heartbeat in circulation are 
indicative  of   death  only  when  they  persist 
long enough for the brain to die” [5].
More recently, Dr. Sam Shemie has clarified 
the paradigm for donation and death by em-
phasizing on the “required absence of  circula-
tion” (as stipulated by the UDDA; and thus, 
not just heartbeat) and by underscoring the 
vital function of  the brain as an essential cri-
terion of  life [6]. “Where extracorporeal ma-
chines or transplantation can support or re-
place the function of  organs such as the heart, 
lung, liver or kidney, the brain is the only or-
gan that cannot be supported or replaced by 
medical technology.”
CHALLENGING THE CONCEPT 
OF DEATH AS DETERMINED BY 
EVALUATING NEUROLOGIC FUNCTION
Byrne and others have rejected brain death as 
constituting death of  the person contending 
that “cessation of  the entire brain function, 
whether irreversible or not, is not necessar-
ily linked to total destruction of  the brain 
or the death of  the person” [7].  Byrne, ap-
parently,  bases  his  opinion  regarding  death 
as  philosophically  constituting  a  separation 
of  the soul from the body.  However, apply-
ing that personal philosophy to the diagnosis 
of  death defies a legal and medical standard, 
and an ethical and practical sensibility.  No 
one knows when the soul may separate from 
the body at the time of  death.  However, the 
legal and medical definition of  death is clear 
in terms of  neurologic and circulatory func-
tion.  It becomes unethical to impose futile 
clinical treatments to a comatose individual, 
if  the function of  the entire brain is irrevers-
ibly lost.  What would opponents of  the brain 
death determination do with a patient on a 
ventilator  with  such  a  clinical  condition—
have them maintained indefinitely in such a 
state?  To propose the brain death criteria as 
constituting death was the central issue that 
confronted the Harvard Committee in 1967.   
No one knows when the soul separates from 
the body, but a precise time of  death must be 
specified for obvious legal, medical and social 
reasons, so that futile treatment can be con-
cluded (without further obligation or respon-
sibility  to  provide  resuscitative  or  support-
ive technologies) and proper disposition of  
the body with burial and estate and property 
transfer, etc can be exercised [6]. 
For many years, Truog has also objected to 
the  determination  of   death  by  neurologic 
evaluation and by circulatory function [8].   
He recently wrote in the New England Jour-
nal of  Medicine that “arguments about why 
these patients should be considered dead have 
never been fully convincing.  The definition 
of  brain death requires a complete absence of  
all functions of  the entire brain yet many of  
these patients retaining essential neurologic 
function, such as regulated secretion of  hy-
pothalamic hormones” [9].  The rebuttal to 
this assertion has been given by Shemie who 
claimed that “the release of  antidiuretic hor-
mone (ADH) from the hypothalamus is not 
considered  to  be  essential  neurologic  func-
tion; rather, neurologic function is determined 
by an absence of  consciousness, receptivity 
and responsiveness, spontaneous movement, 
spontaneous  breathing,  and  an  absence  of  
brainstem  reflexes.”  (Personal  communica-
tion)
Brain death does not require every brain cell 
to  be  nonviable  but  the  criteria  require  an 
irreversible  loss  of   neurologic  function  of  
a  patient  interminably  supported  by  a  me-
chanical respirator.  For Truog and Shewmon 
however,  these  patients  are  not  considered 
dead because they indeed can be supported 
indefinitely beyond the acute phase of  their 
illness [10].  It is well known however, that 
despite the irreversible loss of  brain function, 
the remainder of  the body can be maintained 
by  mechanical  support;  for  example,  even 
by  patients  who  become  brain-dead  during 
pregnancy yet successfully have their fetuses 
brought to term.  The clinical condition still 
constitutes the death of  the mother and a vi-
able fetus by continued mechanical support 
until birth [6].  
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CHALLENGING THE CONCEPT OF 
DEATH AS DETERMINED BY ABSENCE 
OF CIRCULATION
Again, in the New England Journal of  Medi-
cine, Truog and Veatch have recently asserted 
that donation after cardiac death (DCD) is not 
acceptable; that is, the recovery of  organs af-
ter the determination of  death by circulatory 
and respiratory criteria [9, 11]. Troug sug-
gests that the recovery of  the heart following 
DCD is “paradoxical” because “the heart of  
patients who have been declared dead on the 
basis of  the irreversible loss of  cardiac func-
tion have in fact been transplanted and suc-
cessfully functioned in the chest of  another.”   
Veatch  is  similarly  not  convinced  that  the 
donor is dead and stated that “if  someone is 
pronounced dead on the basis of  irreversible 
loss of  heart function, after all, it would not 
be possible for heart function to be restored in 
another body” [11]. 
Both  Veatch  and  Troug  misinterpret  the 
UDDA which precisely stated that it applies 
to an individual who has sustained irrevers-
ible cessation of  circulatory and respiratory 
functions.  It is not a matter of  the cessation 
of  heartbeat or cardiac function per se but an 
irreversible  cessation  of   circulation  in  the 
donor.  The consequence of  the absence of  
circulation is upon the function of  the brain.   
An irreversible loss of  blood flow to the brain 
results in an irreversible loss of  neurologic 
function—the UDDA definition of  death. 
Bernat  has  written  that  circulation—not 
heartbeat—is the critical function that must 
be lost using circulatory-respiratory tests to 
determine death [12].  For example, we do 
not declare patients dead who are on heart-
lung  machines  during  cardiac  surgery,  on 
ECMO awaiting heart transplantation (even 
if   they  never  receive  a  heart),  or  carrying 
artificial hearts because, despite absence of  
heartbeat, their circulation remains continu-
ously  maintained.    That  is  why  the  death 
standard requires absence of  circulation.
“Whether the asystolic heart is subsequent-
ly left alone, removed and not restarted, or 
removed and restarted in another patient is 
irrelevant  to  the  circulatory  status  of   the 
just-declared  dead  patient.    Removing  and 
restarting the heart elsewhere simply has no 
impact on the previous death determination 
because  that  patient  remains  permanently 
without circulation in exactly the same way 
as if  the non-beating heart had been left in 
place.”  (Bernat’s personal communication)
DEFINING CESSATION AND 
IRREVERSIBILITY
For the determination of  death by the irre-
versible cessation of  circulatory and respira-
tory functions in a controlled setting of  organ 
donation, that is, following the withdrawal of  
futile treatment-controlled DCD in a hospital 
setting, cessation and irreversibility should be 
defined.  Cessation is recognized by clinical 
examination that detects the absence of  re-
sponsiveness, heart sounds, pulse and respira-
tory effort [13].  The medical circumstances 
of  DCD may require the use of  confirmatory 
objective tests such as electronic monitoring 
or absence of  pulse pressure as determined 
through an arterial catheter. 
Bernat has introduced the concept of  perma-
nency to confirm irreversibility and proposed 
the following formulation: An “irreversible” 
loss of  function means that the function can-
not  be  restored  by  any  known  technology 
[13].  Bernat stated that “irreversibility” is 
an absolute and univocal condition that im-
plies impossibility and does not rely on intent 
or action.  In contrast, a “permanent” loss of  
function means that the function will not be 
restored because it will neither return sponta-
neously, nor will it return as a result of  medi-
cal  intervention—because  physicians  have 
decided not to attempt resuscitation.  “Perma-
nent” is a contingent and equivocal condition 
that  admits  possibility  and  relies  on  intent 
and action.  The two conditions are causally 
related.  All functions that are irreversibly lost 
are also permanently lost (but not vice versa) 
and in DCD death determinations, functions 
that are lost permanently, quickly and inevi-
tably become lost irreversibly.  The National 
Conference on Donation after Cardiac Death 
accepted this formulation that the irreversible 
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loss of  circulation is confirmed by the obser-
vation that circulation will not resume spon-
taneously and circulation will not be restored 
on medically and ethically justifiable grounds.
Irreversibility is recognized by persistent ces-
sation of functions during an appropriate pe-
riod of observation [13]. 
THE DURATION OF ABSENCE OF 
CIRCULATION
Such criteria now include a period of  witness-
ing the cessation of  circulation by the patient 
care team (independent of  the organ recov-
ery or transplant team) of  at least two and no 
more than five minutes following the initial 
observation of  asystole to attest its irrevers-
ibility.
THE USE OF EXTRACORPOREAL 
MACHINE OXYGENATION (ECMO)
Protocols administering ECMO to the donor 
after the determination of  cardiac death have 
become controversial.  Bernat has written a 
companion article in the New England Journal 
of  Medicine specifically addressing the issue 
of  ECMO [12].  He noted that “if  ECMO 
adequately provided circulation and oxygen-
ation to the donor’s entire body, it would ret-
roactively negate the death determination by 
preventing the loss of  circulation and respi-
ration from becoming permanent or irrevers-
ible, potentially ‘reanimating’ the heart and 
preventing the progression to brain destruc-
tion  on  which  the  circulatory criterion  of  
death is predicated.”
These protocols attempt to circumvent heart 
reanimation or resumption of  brain circula-
tion by the placement of  an inflatable balloon 
catheter in the aorta.  There is general agree-
ment  that  restoring  circulation  by  ECMO 
following  the  declaration  of   death  by  any 
reversible cessation of  circulation is funda-
mentally contradictory to the death declara-
tion.  To accomplish a declaration of  death 
by absence of  neurologic function in this set-
ting by either the insertion of  a balloon cath-
eter in the thoracic aorta or the ligation of  
the carotid artery is unacceptable because it 
becomes the active causation of  absence of  
neurologic function.  If  that approach was to 
be ethically permissible, the rhetorical ques-
tion might be posed: Why not ligate the ca-
rotid arteries antecedent of  the spontaneous 
absence of  circulation?
THE DENVER PROTOCOL
Boucek, et al, have presented case reports in 
the New England Journal of  Medicine about 
the recovery of  hearts from infants declared 
dead by absence of  circulation and stated that 
“when cardiocirculatory function ceased, the 
first patient was observed for three minutes 
before death was declared and the organ-do-
nation process initiated.  On the basis of  rec-
ommendations of  the ethics committee, for 
the other two donors, the observation period 
was shortened to 1.25 minutes” [14].  
Bernat has criticized this approach and men-
tioned “what minimum duration of  asystole 
ensures that autoresuscitation will not occur 
is an empirical question that can be answered 
conclusively only after observing many hun-
dreds  of   patients”  [12].    The  Institute  of  
Medicine and the Canadian Council for Do-
nation and Transplantation recommend a pe-
riod of  five minutes of  absent circulation to 
elapse before the patient is declared dead (15).   
In 2005, participants in a national conference 
on this topic agreed with the recommenda-
tion by the Society of  Critical Care Medicine 
to wait at least two and at most five minutes 
[16]. 
THE USE OF HEPARIN
The administration of  heparin at the time of  
the withdrawal of  life sustaining treatment is 
the current standard of  care and a key com-
ponent of  DCD best practice.  The long-term 
survival of  the transplanted organ may be at 
risk if  thrombi impede circulation to the or-
gan after reperfusion.  The omission of  hepa-
rin could negatively impact organ recovery 
and hinder the acceptance of  recovered or-
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gans for transplantation. 
The use of  heparin has been considered con-
troversial  on  the  basis  of   theoretical  con-
cerns that it may hasten the death of  the do-
nor [17].  However, there is no evidence that 
heparin would cause sufficient bleeding after 
the withdrawal of  treatment to be the cause 
of  death.  While heparin may prevent clot-
ting in a patient who is actively bleeding, it 
is unlikely to cause bleeding in a head injured 
patient who is not actively bleeding.  It should 
not be overlooked that the event of  demise is 
the withdrawal of  life support that affects the 
loss of  circulation and respiration (and not 
the use of  heparin).  
Finally, the principle of  double effect asserts 
that an action that produces a good effect and 
a bad effect might be permissible if  the good 
effect is intended and the bad effect is merely 
foreseen but unintended.
THE DEAD DONOR RULE AND ORGAN 
DONATION
Robertson wrote more than a decade ago that 
the  retrieval  of   organs  for  transplantation 
should not cause the death of  a donor [18].   
This  rule  has since  been  the  ethical  axiom 
of  organ donation; thus, no organ recovery 
should precede the declaration of  death. 
Recently however, Truog has stated that “a 
better  approach  to  procuring  vital  organs 
while protecting vulnerable patients against 
abuse would be to emphasize the importance 
of  obtaining valid informed consent for organ 
donation from patients or surrogates before 
the withdrawal of  life-sustaining treatment 
in situations of  devastating and irreversible 
neurologic injury” [9].
There is no support or intention of  the organ 
donation community to rescind the dead do-
nor rule.  The public trust in organ donation 
hinges  upon  an  assurance  that  the  medical 
professional will prioritize the care of  the dy-
ing patient over any other objectives, however 
noble or good.  
One could readily anticipate a societal skep-
ticism  if   medical  professionals  present  the 
following approach to the family of  a dying 
patient; it was described by Troug that “your 
family member has a devastating neurologic 
injury but is not dead.  If  you consent to the 
removal of  organs now before the determina-
tion of  death, it will result in the death of  
your  family  member  but  it  would  enhance 
the possibility of  successful transplantation 
of  organs.”  The rejection of  that scenario as 
proposed by Troug, is evident in the recent 
trial of  a transplant surgeon that was accused 
of  hastening the death of  an individual in the 
recovery of  organs [19]. 
CHURCH POSITION
In the address of  Pope John Paul II to the 
Transplantation Congress in Rome in 2000, 
regarding  the  determination  of   death,  he 
said “… it is helpful to recall that the death 
of  the person is a single event, consisting in 
the total disintegration of  that unitary and 
integrated  whole  that  is  the  personal  self.” 
And that “it is a well-known fact that for some 
time  certain  scientific  approaches  to  ascer-
taining death have shifted the emphasis from 
the traditional cardiorespiratory signs to the 
so-called  ‘neurological’  criterion.    Specifi-
cally, this consists in establishing, according 
to clearly determined parameters commonly 
held by the international scientific communi-
ty, the complete and irreversible cessation of  
all brain activity (in the cerebrum, cerebellum 
and brain stem).  This is then considered the 
sign that the individual organism has lost its 
integrative capacity” [20].
For those who are involved in the transplan-
tation of  organs from the deceased, this Papal 
testimony is reassuring of  a moral propriety 
that  can  be  defended  medically—the  valid 
concept of  death by neurologic criteria [21]. 
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